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DOG WHISTLING, THE COLOR-BLIND 
JURISPRUDENTIAL REGIME, AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF RACE 
DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL 
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND 
WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS. By Ian Haney 
López.1 New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. 
ix + 277. $24.95 (cloth). 
Calvin TerBeek2 
Ian Haney López’s new book, Dog Whistle Politics: How 
Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the 
Middle Class, has a provocative thesis. López contends that dog 
whistling, that is, coded racial rhetoric, “explains how politicians 
backed by concentrated wealth manipulate racial appeals to win 
elections and also to win support for regressive policies that help 
corporations and the super-rich, and in the process wreck the 
middle class” (p. xii). López does not ignore other factors that led 
to the rise of the New Right political regime, but to him, dog 
whistling is first among equals (pp. 7–8, 29–30). If this thesis holds 
up to scrutiny, it has much explanatory purchase, not only for 
understanding ordinary or “low” politics, but perhaps for helping 
us navigate the Court’s turn to racial conservatism over the past 
40-plus years. 
López’s argument is consonant with the relevant literature. 
“Many white Americans hold negative views of African 
Americans, and these racial predispositions are powerful 
predictors of opinions on a host of political issues.”3 Or as Rogers 
Smith and Desmond King put it in their elegant study: “on issue 
 1.  John H. Boalt Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
 2.  J.D., Tulane University. Calvin TerBeek has clerked for state and federal court 
judges, litigated for a Vault 100 firm and a boutique law firm; he is currently a prospective 
Ph.D. student. 
 3. Gregory A. Huber & John S. Lapinski, The “Race Card” Revisited: Assessing 
Racial Priming in Policy Contests, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 421 (2006) (citing studies by 
Lawrence Bobo and Martin Gilens among others). 
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after issue involving a wide range of the most foundational 
structures in American life, almost all of the same actors have 
lined up on one side or the other of positions framed by support 
for or opposition to race-conscious policies designed to alleviate 
material racial inequalities.”4 However, when one digs down 
further, López’s argument cannot carry all the water he claims. As 
we will see, dog whistling has perhaps given politicians a new way 
to talk about race, but dog whistling has not “wrecked” the middle 
class. What is more, López does not advance the ball in 
understanding the Supreme Court’s latest iteration of racial 
conservatism.5 
But this hardly obviates the interest with which we should 
engage López’s argument. López has identified an interesting 
aspect of contemporary politics, and has ably told a story integral 
to understanding the politics of race. When one party is as racially 
homogenous as the modern Republican Party—eighty-eight 
percent of the people who voted for Republican presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney were white (p. 1)—surely race must have 
some explanatory factor. Moreover, as Jack Balkin recently 
noted, the two major political parties have not been this polarized 
since the Civil War.6 López has then perhaps identified one of the 
culprits—dog whistle racism. 
The careful reader will have noticed that López’s explicit 
thesis is about politicians, but the Court plays a role in his story as 
well. However, López’s analysis of the Court is discursive. This is 
unfortunate. To fully vet López’s thesis, we need to include the 
Supreme Court—a political actor (high politics, yes, but a political 
institution nonetheless)—as a central player. That is, if we are to 
fully understand López’s claim and finger the dog whistling 
coming from all relevant political actors, we need to look at what 
the Supreme Court has been doing to support the policies of racial 
conservatives. As Cornell Clayton and J. Mitchell Pickerill have 
put it: “[r]ather than a check on majority power, the federal courts 
often function as arenas for extending, legitimizing, harmonizing 
or protecting the policy agenda of political elites or groups within 
the dominant governing coalition.”7 
 4. DESMOND S. KING & ROGERS M. SMITH, STILL A HOUSE DIVIDED: RACE AND 
POLITICS IN OBAMA’S AMERICA 258 (2011). 
 5. Id. at 35–89. 
 6. Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System is 
Dysfunctional, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1189 (2014). 
 7. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How 
the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 
GEO. L.J 1385, 1391 (2006).  
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What is more, perhaps some of the justices engage in dog 
whistling of a jurisprudential sort. Recall that Justice Scalia, in 
2011, writing in dissent in Brown v. Plata (the California prison 
case) stated: “many [of the released prisoners] will undoubtedly 
be fine physical specimens who have developed intimidating 
muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.”8 This rhetoric was 
pointless to any legal issue presented in the case and was both 
anachronistic and largely inaccurate.9 To give one more example: 
we know that President Reagan wanted to appoint anti-
affirmative action judges to the federal courts such that the 
judiciary could carry out the “politically charged” work of ending 
affirmative action.10 Thus, it is crucial to address the Supreme 
Court for a full examination of racial conservatism.11 
This review essay will proceed in the following fashion: I will 
follow López’s political narrative, stopping, as he does, at each 
successive presidential election, but I will supplement his 
analysis—and, where needed, question it—with an assessment of 
what the Court was doing during and in between the elections in 
regard to race and constitutional politics. In other words, we need 
to analyze what I will call the color-blind jurisprudential regime12 
of the New Right—is this regime acting in concert with 
Republican elites to help implement racial conservatives’ 
preferences? 
Before beginning, though, let us set forth a full-fledged 
definition of our analytical set-piece: what is dog whistling? López 
gives a lengthy definition of dog whistle politics complete with a 
fighting metaphor (pp. 3-5). The most insightful aspect of López’s 
definition is the plausible deniability it gives its users because the 
 8. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1953 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 9. Brian Palmer, Do Prisoners Really Spend All Their Time Lifting Weights?, SLATE 
(May 24, 2011, 6:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2011/05/do_prisoners_really_spend_all_their_time_lifting_weights.html. 
 10. KING & SMITH, supra note 4, at 124. 
 11. For an important caveat to the regime politics approach, see Matthew E.K. Hall, 
Rethinking Regime Politics, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 878 (2012) (arguing that the regime 
politics literature does not conform to the Court’s actual actions when striking down 
federal statutes); see also Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The 
Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511 (2007) 
(arguing that the regime politics literature can be overdeterministic when taken too far). 
 12. Howard Gillman, Regime Politics, Jurisprudential Regimes, and Unenumerated 
Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 107, 114 (2006) (defining a jurisprudential regime as “the way 
in which judges translate their political ideologies and identities into a preferred legal 
analysis. This legal analysis is made up of a set of rules, concepts, doctrines, precedents, 
and tests that collectively establish a standard operating procedure for the treatment of 
certain kinds of claims.”), citing Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential 
Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 308 (2002).  
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whistler never explicitly mentions race. But one would be hard-
pressed to improve on Lee Atwater’s infamous definition (which 
López cites): 
You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 
1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you 
say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, 
and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about 
cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are 
totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get 
hurt worse than whites . . . . “We want to cut this,” is much more 
abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more 
abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”13 
The first politician that jumps to mind when reading 
Atwater’s quote is George Wallace. López explains Wallace’s 
electoral gambit (pp. 13-17),14 but the story of how the modern 
political parties became racially identifiable (the Democrats as 
racial liberals and the Republicans as racial conservatives), starts 
in 1964, as López rightly notes. Political scientists have 
persuasively shown this presidential election as the partisan 
cleavage point in the modern era of racial politics.15 
At around this same time, “History’s Warren Court” (1962-
1968) was hitting its stride. As Lucas Powe argues, the Warren 
Court was a partner with the Kennedy and Johnson 
 13. Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern 
Strategy, THE NATION, Nov. 13, 2012, available at http://www.thenation.com
/article/170841/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy#. 
Perlstein also provides some useful context for Atwater’s remarks. 
 14. Wallace said after losing his 1958 gubernatorial bid in Alabama, “no other son-
of-a-bitch will ever out-nigger me again” (p. 14). As Wallace biographer Dan T. Carter has 
noted, there is some question whether this is the precise quote, but the weight of the 
evidence tends in that direction. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE 
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS 96 (1995). 
 15. The seminal study is EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE 
EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 73 (1989) 
(“[T]he 1964 campaign appears to have set in motion an issue realignment among 
citizens.”). It would take us too far afield to review the events leadings up to 1964, but 
some of the best work for understanding such includes: MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND 
ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 
(2005); JOSEPH E. LOWNDES, FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT: RACE AND THE 
SOUTHERN ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM (2008); Pamela Brandwein, 
Reconstruction, Race, and Revolution, in RACE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 125 (Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov & Dorian T. Warren eds., 2008); 
Naomi Murakawa, The Origins of the Carceral Crisis: Racial Order as “Law and Order” in 
Postwar American Politics, in RACE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 234 
(Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov & Dorian T. Warren eds., 2008); Vesla M. Weaver, 
Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV. 
230 (2007).   
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Administrations in supporting the New Deal coalition and 
dragging a recalcitrant South into line with national expectations 
regarding its treatment of largely African American criminal 
defendants.16 An in-depth history of the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure jurisprudence is unnecessary here (it has been 
recounted countless times), but a reminder of its “greatest hits” is 
useful: Gideon v. Wainwright,17 Escobedo v. Illinois,18 and 
Miranda v. Arizona.19 These were the cases that the liberals 
cheered and the conservatives blanched at.20 
And as much as liberalism seemed ascendant in 1964,21 not all 
were on board. When Chief Justice Warren was invited to speak 
at Georgia Tech University in 1963, “Bircher” Frank H. Benning 
distributed signs imploring “Help Impeach Earl Warren.”22 These 
were Goldwater voters. Movement conservatives in the “Draft 
Goldwater” camp, with an efficiency that Lenin would have 
admired, had systematically overtaken the levers of power in the 
Republican Party23 and removed moderate Republican New York 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller from serious consideration on 
Goldwater’s way to the nomination. Citing no sources, López 
contends that Goldwater “probably harbored prejudiced views” 
(p. 35). The evidence suggests otherwise. Goldwater had been a 
member of the NAACP, helped found the National Urban 
League chapter in Phoenix, and was “a strong supporter of 
voluntary integration.”24 Indeed, when his lagging campaign 
created a political ad that was overtly racial, Goldwater refused to 
run the ad, stating: “I’m not going to be made out to be a racist. 
You can’t show it.”25 
 16. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).  
 17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding indigent criminal defendants are entitled to a lawyer 
during trial). 
 18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding accused are entitled to a lawyer during police 
interrogations under the Sixth Amendment). 
 19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (setting forth the procedures police must follow in order to 
extract a confession from a suspect). 
 20. For a powerful critique of the unintended consequences of the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure revolution, see WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227–36 (2011). 
 21. RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND 4 (2008) (“Lyndon Johnson had spent 1964, the 
first year of his accidental presidency, redeeming the martyr: passing, with breathtaking 
aplomb, a liberal legislative agenda that had only known existence as wish during John F. 
Kennedy’s lifetime.”). 
 22. The South: Hello, Earl, TIME, Feb. 22, 1963, at 24. 
 23. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 62. 
 24. FLAMM, supra note 15, at 36. 
 25. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 75.    
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But if Goldwater was not a racist, some of his supporters 
decidedly were.26 And, at all events, López is correct that 
Goldwater knew full well how to blow the dog whistle: “We’re not 
going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we ought 
to go hunting where the ducks are,” Goldwater said (p. 18). Other 
examples in historian Michael Flamm’s telling abound, including 
Goldwater’s convention speech where he decried “the license of 
the mob and of the jungle.”27 The jungle, needless to say, was the 
urban environment. What is more, consistent with López’s 
analysis, the Goldwater camp consistently denied that any of their 
rhetoric was racialized in nature.28 Goldwater also attacked the 
Supreme Court for its criminal procedure decisions.29 In reaction 
to Escobedo, Goldwater invoked “law and order” and tied the 
Court to the (putatively)30 rising crime rate. And it was none other 
than a young staffer named William Rehnquist who devised a 
“non-racial,” in Goldwater’s eyes, color-blind approach to the 
issue of integration: the right to associate (or not) (pp. 83-84).31 
One might question, however, if Goldwater was not dog 
whistling so much as, to mix metaphors, preaching to the already 
racially conservative choir. Sociologist Katherine Beckett has 
shown that it was political elites, like Goldwater, who raised the 
issue of crime via the rhetoric of “law and order”—that is, crime 
was not a concern in public opinion polls when Goldwater, among 
others, began talking about it. 32 However, as Beckett also notes, 
those who said they were most concerned about crime were also 
much more likely to be racially conservative.33 Moreover, dog 
whistling is what social psychologists call “priming.”34 That is to 
say, campaigns use priming to “remind prospective voters of the 
electoral relevance of pre-existing political attitudes and 
perceptions.”35 López assumes that dog whistling necessarily 
 26. Id. at 56, 69, 72–73. And, as López notes, using racial appeals to attempt to win 
votes, surely does not absolve Goldwater (pp. 48–50). 
 27. FLAMM, supra note 15, at 31. See also id. at 33, 42–43.  
 28. Id. at 43. 
 29. Id. at 42. 
 30. Scholars have raised questions about the adequacy of the statistics showing that 
the crime rate spiked in the 1960s. See Weaver, supra note 15, at 233. 
 31. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 74. 
 32. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY 32 (1997).  
 33. Id. at 84. 
 34. Larry M. Bartels, Priming and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns, in 
CAPTURING CAMPAIGN EFFECTS 78, 84–92 (Henry E. Brady & Richard Johnston eds., 
2006).  
 35. Id. at 84–85 (emphasis added). What is more, Bartels concludes that priming (e.g., 
dog whistling) probably does not much matter electorally. Id. at 92.   
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causes people to vote in a certain way, but provides little evidence 
to support this assumption. 
Whichever way the causal direction runs (a point to which we 
will return), Goldwater was far from alone in using the Warren 
Court as a rhetorical punching bag. South Carolina Senator Strom 
Thurmond of “Dixiecrat” fame (officially named the States 
Rights Democratic Party) used the confirmation hearing of 
Justice Abe Fortas to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice to 
drive home the “law and order” theme (one might also recall that 
Homer Thornberry from Texas was going to take Fortas’s seat 
had things gone according to plan; they did not). In the summer 
of 1968, when the hearings began, Thurmond wasted little time in 
going for Fortas’s jugular: 
Does not that decision, Mallory—I want that word to ring in 
your ear—Mallory . . . . a man who raped a woman, admitted 
his guilt, and the Supreme Court set him loose on a 
technicality . . . . Is not that type of decision calculated to bring 
the courts and the law and the administration of justice into 
disrepute? Is not that type of decision calculated to encourage 
more people to commit rapes and serious crimes? Can you as a 
Justice of the Supreme Court condone such a decision as that? 
I ask you to answer that question.36 
According to historian Rick Perlstein, Fortas sat silent for a 
full minute—it is difficult to imagine the “optics” of such in today’s 
media culture—before declining to answer.37 No doubt Thurmond 
knew that Fortas was not on the bench when Mallory was decided 
and the “technicality” was exactly the sort of Southern police 
conduct the Warren Court was concerned about,38 but the damage 
Thurmond sought to inflict was done (although what finally did in 
Fortas was his financial improprieties).39 
As Thurmond’s treatment of Fortas shows, “law and order” 
was ascendant as a political catchphrase in the 1960s. No doubt, 
law and order was a coded racial appeal, but it cannot be 
overlooked that part of the catchphrase’s cogency was “due to the 
widespread loss of popular faith in liberalism’s ability to ensure 
 36. Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry: Hearings before the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, available at http://www.loc.gov/
law/find/nominations/thornberry/hearing-pt1a.pdf. 
 37. PERLSTEIN, supra note 21, at 286. 
 38. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 450–52 (1957). 
 39. PERLSTEIN, supra note 21, at 382. Fortas’s nomination for Chief Justice was 
ultimately filibustered, but he remained on the Court as an associate justice. However, 
after Nixon’s election, his financial improprieties came to light and he stepped down, thus 
allowing Nixon two appointments early in his first Term.  
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personal security. The reaction against the Great Society was 
likewise rooted significantly in the perception that it had failed to 
curb social unrest—and may have even contributed to it.”40 
López, however, spends one solitary sentence discussing this 
social unrest—e.g., the riots in Harlem and elsewhere in 1964, the 
Watts riot of 1965, the “long hot summer” of 1967, the rise of the 
“Black Power” movement—that had been seared into the 
national consciousness in the intervening years. López then 
spends just over two pages identifying Nixon’s dog whistling in 
1968. According to López: “Nixon had mastered Wallace’s dark 
art” (p. 24). Q.E.D. 
But scholars who have carefully studied the 1968 Campaign 
come to a more nuanced conclusion. Nixon, with Wallace flanking 
his right, and Humphrey his left, positioned himself as a racial 
moderate, knowing that Wallace’s overheated racial rhetoric was 
not palatable to the larger voting public.41 Indeed, Joseph 
Lowndes’ study of the modern Right comes to the conclusion that 
Nixon’s appeal to racial conservatives late in the campaign was to 
not “waste” their vote on Wallace because it would simply help 
Humphrey.42 Historian Joan Huff has noted: “Far from being a 
bland supporter of civil rights, Nixon’s record was better than any 
of the political opponents he ran against . . . with the exception of 
Hubert Humphrey.”43 As Nixon’s Health, Education and Welfare 
Secretary, Robert Finch, told a group of mostly African American 
visitors regarding desegregation: “You’d be better informed if 
instead of listening to what we say you watch what we do.”44 
Indeed, Nixon’s electoral margin of victory in 1968 was slim, 
and it was his 1972 demolition of liberal lion George McGovern, 
as opposed to 1968, where Nixon better connected with voters on 
the law and order cum “racial problem” issue.45 In sum, it seems 
like a more nuanced conclusion must be arrived at vis-à-vis 
Nixon’s rhetoric in 1968. In that year, it was Wallace, not Nixon, 
who carried the Deep South states of Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina, while Nixon focused on 
the border South states.46 Law and order certainly had a racial and 
 40. FLAMM, supra note 15, at 9. 
 41. KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL 
LIBERALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 56–60 (2011). 
 42. LOWNDES, supra note 15, at 119, 130–31. 
 43. JOAN HOFF, NIXON RECONSIDERED 78 (1994). 
 44. MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 65. 
 45. Id. at 236–37. 
 46. Id. at 56–57. López fails to note that as far back as 1968, the Democrats were 
engaged in their own dog whistling (as we will see, López erroneously traces it back to  
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racist component to it, but there is murkiness to Nixon’s dog 
whistling, such as it was, during the 1968 campaign. 
To be sure, Nixon’s dog whistling did pick up after his 
election in 1968, but it is inaccurate to assert, as López does, that 
1972 was Nixon’s “first full dog whistle campaign” (p. 26). Despite 
discussing Nixon’s generalized dog whistling during his first-term, 
López fails to analyze the results of the 1970 mid-term elections. 
Nixon and Agnew campaigned hard for their preferred candidates 
on the “permissiveness” theme, attacked the federal courts and 
banged the law and order drum.47 The rhetoric failed to register 
with voters in 1970. As the New York Times gloated in a post-
mortem: “outside of Tennessee,” the “‘Southern strategy’ 
encountered disaster everywhere,” further noting that Nixon 
failed in pushing the “crime-violence issue;” “rarely,” the 
Editorial Board continued, “has a Chief Executive laid down such 
a hard, aggressive line and pushed it so persistently.”48 In short, 
the 1970 mid-term elections pose a problem for López’s thesis. 
During this same time-frame, Federal Appeals Court judge 
Warren Earl Burger was appointed Chief Justice, Southerners 
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell went down to 
ignominious defeats in the Senate, and Harry Blackmun was 
confirmed as an Associate Justice. Half of the “Nixon Four” were 
in place. Both these Justices were part of the Court’s unanimous 
opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power,49 which López calls the “high-
water mark for anti-discrimination law” (p. 86)—correctly from a 
race-conscious perspective—but he fails to note that the Nixon 
Justice Department filed two briefs arguing that the Court should 
rule in the employees’ favor (which it of course did).50 
While Blackmun would drift to the left over the years, 
eventually becoming a reliable liberal vote, Burger would stay in 
the conservative fold at least insofar as criminal cases were 
Jimmy Carter with a similarly erroneous analysis of Carter’s alleged dog whistling). At a 
1968 Democratic primary debate against Eugene McCarthy, Bobby Kennedy, in response 
to McCarthy’s answer to a question about public housing said: “You say you’re going to 
take ten thousand black people and move them into Orange County? It is just going to be 
a catastrophe.” FLAMM, supra note 15, at 150. Given Orange County’s well-known 
conservatism, this was dog whistling at its finest. LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2001). 
 47. MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 136–38. 
 48. Quoted in MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 140. 
 49. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (setting forth a disparate or adverse impact test in the 
employment discrimination context regardless of the employer’s intent or motive). 
 50. MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 198–99.  
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concerned; he would move further to the right in the 1980s.51 But 
compared with Nixon’s nomination and subsequent confirmation 
of Justice “Renchburg,”52 Burger was moderate. Nixon’s fourth 
and final appointment was the conservative Lewis Powell (though 
he remained committed to Roe v. Wade throughout his time on 
the bench).53 
Nixon, though, did not care much about abortion and the 
administration’s reaction to Roe was muted, at most. As Kevin 
McMahon has shown, Nixon was not particularly ideological vis-
à-vis all the issues that came before the Supreme Court, but 
crafted his rhetoric and nomination strategy for electoral gain, 
focusing on the law and order and school desegregation issues in 
1972.54 Scholars agree that bussing was the central racial issue of 
the 1972 campaign, pitting Nixon versus McGovern.55 While 
López is correct that Nixon campaigned heavily on racial issues in 
1972 (p. 26), it cannot be omitted (as López does) that by 1972 
voters were able to accurately place McGovern and Nixon in their 
respective ideological spaces on racial issues—this partially 
explains Nixon’s outsized performance with “urban ethnics” in 
the North.56 Again, we have to contend with the question of which 
way the causal connection is running—preaching or whistling? 
Regime politics scholars would fall into the preaching camp, 
at least insofar as the newly appointed Justices implementing a 
president’s agenda goes. And the Court, with all of Nixon’s 
appointees in the majority (along with Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence) largely placed an end to the bussing issue with 
Milliken v. Bradley.57 Given Nixon’s agenda, also unsurprising was 
the Burger Court’s slow but steady devolution of the Warren 
Court criminal procedure decisions. Assessing the Burger Court’s 
work in 1984, Charles Whitebread concluded: “it is now clear that 
 51. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When 
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1498, 1504–05 1515–17 (2007). 
 52. President Nixon, in discussing Rehnquist in 1971, said: “you remember the 
meeting we had when I told that group of clowns we had around there. Renchburg and 
that group. What’s his name? . . . . Yeah, Renchquist.” DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE 
REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT AND LEGACY 6 (2006). Despite 
mangling it twice, Nixon got it right when he announced his nomination of Rehnquist to 
the Court. 
 53. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Powell: Moderation amid Divisions, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 1987, at 32 (“On abortion he remained committed, with a shrinking majority, to 
the 1973 precedent that established it as a constitutional right.”). 
 54. See generally MCMAHON, supra note 41. 
 55. Id. at 233. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that a “multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-
district de jure segregation problem” was beyond the scope of the equal protection clause).  
 
TERBEEK LOPEZ_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:13 PM 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 177 
the crime control model of the criminal process commands a 
majority of the present Court. This majority is eager to 
accommodate what it perceives as legitimate needs of effective 
law enforcement and to assist the police by eliminating legal 
obstacles whenever possible.”58 The color-blind jurisprudential 
regime was thickening. 
While the Burger Court was slowing the pace of racial 
liberalism in the 1970s, Nixon was forced to resign as a result of 
Watergate and Vice-President Gerald Ford assumed the Oval 
Office. In 1976, Ford ran against Georgia Governor Jimmy 
Carter. López wants to place the outcome of the 1976 election as 
turning on Jimmy Carter’s putative dog whistling in contrast to 
Gerald Ford’s alleged refusal to do so: “Moreover, Carter’s racial 
pandering— and Ford’s principled failure—seemed to cement the 
political logic of race-baiting” (p. 56). López hinges his argument 
on one quote by Carter about ethnic neighborhoods and forced 
integration by government.59 López then puzzlingly avers that 
Carter actually won because of the black vote—African 
Americans were “still furious at Nixon’s dog whistling” (p. 56). 
But Carter was a racial moderate, if not a racial liberal,60 and 
Ford was no shrinking violet when it came to confronting racial 
politics. In their first debate, centering on domestic politics, 
Carter stated: “We have got a sharp distinction drawn between 
white collar crime. The big shots who are rich, who are influential, 
very seldom go to jail. Those who are poor and who have no 
influence quite often are the ones who are punished.” Meanwhile, 
Ford talked about mandatory-minimums: “We believe that we 
can do a better job in the area of crime, but that requires tougher 
sentencing-mandatory, certain prison sentences for those who 
violate our criminal laws.”61 
 58. Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court’s Counter-Revolution in Criminal 
Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 
WASHBURN L. J. 471, 471 (1984). 
 59. That quote being: “I have nothing against a community that’s made up of people 
who are Polish or Czechoslovakian or French-Canadian, or who are blacks trying to 
maintain the ethnic purity of their neighborhoods. This is a natural inclination on the part 
of the people. I don’t think government ought to deliberately try to break down an 
ethnically oriented neighborhood by artificially injecting into it someone from another 
ethnic group just to create some form of integration” (pp. 55-56). Carter swiftly apologized 
for the remark—in other words, this does not fit into López’s definition of dog whistling, 
where the dog whistler denies any racist intent and instead accuses the initial accuser of 
playing the race card (pp. 129–34).  
 60. SEAN WILENTZ, THE AGE OF REAGAN: A HISTORY 1974-2008, 69, 122 (2008). 
 61. Debate with President Gerald Ford (Domestic Issues) Sept. 23, 1976, available at 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5546.  
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Carter, for his part, stated in the candidates’ third and final 
debate: “I think the greatest thing that ever happened to the 
South was the passage of the civil rights acts and the opening up 
of opportunities to black people, to have a chance to vote, hold a 
job, buy a house, go to school, and participate in public affairs.”62 
Meanwhile, the 1976 Republican Party Platform stated: 
Every American has a right to be protected from criminals. 
Violence has no place in our land. A society that excuses crime 
will eventually fall victim to it. The American people have been 
subjected to an intolerable wave of violent crime. The victim of 
a crime should be treated with compassion and justice. The 
attacker must be kept from harming others. Emphasis must be 
on protecting the innocent and punishing the guilty. Prevention 
of crime is its best deterrent and should be stressed.63 
Indeed, in an April 1975 speech Ford stated, in what appears 
to fit López’s definition of dog whistling quite well: “Too many 
Americans had forgotten that the primary purpose of 
imprisonment was not to rehabilitate the convicted criminal so 
that he could return to society, but to punish him and keep him 
off the streets.”64 Here we see Ford and the Republican Party 
apparatus hitting all the high-notes from Goldwater’s law and 
order operetta. 1976, then, turns López’s dog whistle thesis on its 
head. 
Meanwhile, the “Nixon Court” was continuing to flex its 
muscles during the transition from Carter to Reagan. In 1976, a 
scant four years after declaring Georgia’s death penalty scheme 
unconstitutional—Justices Brennan and Marshall had it that the 
death penalty was always unconstitutional—the Court reversed 
track in Gregg v. Georgia.65 All four of Nixon’s appointees 
(Blackmun concurred) sidelined Furman v. Georgia.66 This is as 
the regime politics literature would predict. Carter, to use 
Stephen Skowronek’s term, was a “disjunctive” president, the last 
of the New Deal coalition/Civil Rights regime presidents, about 
 62. Debate with Gerald Ford, Oct. 22, 1976, available at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6517. 
 63. 1976 Republican Platform: A Safe and Just Society, available at 
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/platform/safejust.htm. 
 64. Reproduced at http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Gerald_Ford_Crime.htm. 
 65. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reinstating the death penalty after a four-year moratorium). 
 66. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding that Georgia’s death penalty scheme was arbitrary 
and thus violated the Eight Amendment). A case challenging the Texas death penalty 
scheme was consolidated with Furman.  
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to give way to a “reconstructive” president: Ronald Reagan.67 The 
Justices appointed by Nixon—Justice Stevens, appointed by Ford, 
had not yet bolted for the liberal side and also joined the Nixon 
Four in Gregg—were beginning to limit or obviate precedent 
from the previous racially liberal jurisprudential regime. 
Another sign that racial conservatism had captured the Court 
was that “color-blindness” began to pervade the Court’s 
decisions, for example in Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney.68 Although many commentators have 
traced the “discriminatory intent” requirement back to 
Washington v. Davis,69 López, in a separate piece of scholarship, 
has persuasively argued that Feeney marked the death knell for 
many discrimination claims.70 The Court now commanded that 
the challenged government action must have been because of 
instead of in spite of the adverse or disparate impact. In other 
words, a litigant could no longer simply show a discriminatory 
impact, she would have to show the government acted, essentially, 
because it wanted to discriminate (a nearly impossible burden to 
meet, even in 1979). Here again, we can see the work of the Nixon 
Four continuing to build a color-blind jurisprudential regime: all 
four Nixon Justices were on board in Feeney; and only Brennan 
and Marshall dissented. The stage was set for the reconstructive 
presidency of Ronald Reagan and his desire to reorient the 
federal judiciary.71 
Of course, Reagan needed to be elected first. López correctly 
notes that Reagan was a master of the dog whistling genre. 
Besides the oft-noted example of his 1980 campaign speech at a 
county fair just outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi—the site of 
the lynching of three civil rights workers in 1966—with an appeal 
to state’s rights (p. 58), López points us toward two of Reagan’s 
favorite campaign speech stories (p. 58). The first concerns the 
Cadillac-driving “welfare queen.” In one such telling, Reagan 
recounted: “In Chicago, they found a woman who holds the 
record. She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers 
to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans’ benefits for four 
 67. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM 
JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON, 399–400, 413–19 (2000). Though Skowronek is now 
exploring the possibility that reconstructive presidencies may no longer be able to occur. 
Stephen Skowronek, Twentieth-Century Remedies, 94 B.U. L. REV. 795 (2014). 
 68. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 69. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 70. Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1825–26, 1829–
34 (2012). 
 71. SKOWRONEK, supra note 67, at 413–19.  
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nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare. Her 
tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year.”72 
Many liberals believed she was a figment of Reagan’s 
imagination—he did have a penchant for exaggerating—however, 
the Chicago welfare queen was an actual person (Linda Taylor), 
and, in fact probably committed crimes far worse than welfare 
fraud.73 But even if she didn’t exist, as the saying goes, someone 
would have invented her. López correctly contends that Reagan’s 
goal was to connect an indolent black woman and a racialized 
welfare system in white voters’ minds (Taylor was African 
American, though she passed herself off as various different races 
when the situation suited her pecuniary interests). 
Perhaps even more explicit than the welfare queen whistle 
was the second of Reagan’s stories, this one about a “strapping 
young buck ahead of you [in the grocery store checkout line] to 
buy a t-bone steak [with food stamps]” while “you were waiting 
in line to buy hamburger” (p. 59). As López notes, the “strapping 
young buck” eventually morphed into a “young fellow” as the 
former was too reminiscent of Wallacian overt racial rhetoric (p. 
59).  
It is difficult to disagree with López that Reagan’s rhetoric is 
not classic dog whistling. It is, however, more complicated to 
assert, as López does, that one can draw a causal line from 
Reagan’s coded rhetoric to his electoral victory (p. 59). Political 
scientist John Sides has shown that the “Reagan Democrats”—
such as they can even be said to exist outside of a media 
construct—most likely voted for Reagan based on more mundane 
concerns such as the economy rather than dog whistling: 
The “New Republicans” [i.e., Reagan Democrats] were not 
drawn disproportionately from the middle to lower strata of the 
population; their conservatism was not more marked on social 
issues than on economic issues; they were neither more religiously 
oriented nor more alienated from government than other voters; 
finally, they bore little similarity to the constituency that provided 
the core support for Wallace in 1968.74 
 72. Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:41 AM) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_taylor_welfare_qu
een_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html. 
 73. Id. 
 74. John Sides, Who Were the Reagan Democrats?, THE MONKEY CAGE, June 16, 
2008, http://themonkeycage.org/2008/06/16/who_were_the_reagan_democrats/ (citing 
Jerome L. Himmelstein & James A. McRae, Jr., Social Conservatism, New Republicans, 
and the 1980 Election, 48 PUB. OPINION Q. 592 (1984)).  
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Sides continues: “Himmelstein and McRae find that these 
New Republicans supported Reagan for much more ordinary 
reasons: they disapproved of the performance of President Carter, 
especially with regard to the economy. This kind of behavior—
retrospective voting based on the performance of the national 
economy—is well-documented and, well, a lot more pedestrian 
than prevailing theories either then or now.”75 Contemporaneous 
polling supports Sides’ argument.76 
Moreover, as political scientist Martin Gilens shows in his 
careful study of welfare, the stereotype of “blacks are lazy” dates 
back centuries, thus undercutting the notion that Reagan 
happened on a novel way to appeal to racial conservatives.77 And 
while it is true that those who still believe in the canard that 
“blacks are lazy” are more likely to want to cut welfare and food 
stamp benefits,78 I come back to my earlier question: is this dog 
whistling or fellow feeling? 
Gilens also shows how the media helped create the 
perception of “poor = black” (and thus in need of welfare) well 
before 1980,79 and also points out the confounding factor that, 
“[e]ven programs strongly associated with blacks can enjoy high 
levels of popular support if the programs are seen as providing 
benefits to those who are trying to help themselves.”80 In light of 
the evidence, it is a bridge too far to state that Reagan won the 
1980 election because of coded racial appeals. 
But what is certain is that more important than mere rhetoric 
was Reagan’s ability to remake the federal judiciary and the 
Supreme Court. Reagan appointed, in succession, Justice 
O’Connor, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, in the interim 
elevating Justice Rehnquist to the center seat. When President 
Bush then secured the nomination of Justice Thomas there was a 
contingent, to varying degrees, of five racial conservatives on the 
Court. (As the Right’s intonation, “No more Souters,” from the 
aughts appointments of Roberts and Alito suggests, that 
 75. Sides, supra note 74. Kevin McMahon has argued that the term “Reagan 
Democrats” is a misnomer and properly placed in electoral time, they might better be 
called “Nixon Democrats.” MCMAHON, supra note 41, at 246–48. 
 76. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
305 (2009). 
 77. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA AND THE 
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 154–56 (1999). 
 78. Id. at 76–77. 
 79. Id. at 102–53. 
 80. Id. at 214.  
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appointment did not turn out as planned).81 Their racial 
conservatism can be seen through this lens. The Reagan Justice 
Department’s stated goal was to roll back the liberal federal 
judiciary.82 Attorney General Edwin Meese gave speeches 
expressing the desire to limit the reach of the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure decisions and end affirmative action.83 
Outside of the higher education affirmative action context, 
the Court has accomplished these racially conservative goals. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, the Court fought over the proper 
standard of review for affirmative action programs. The names of 
these cases are well-known to students of the Court: Fullilove,84 
Croson,85 Metro Broadcasting86 and Adarand.87 As the liberal 
Justices left the Court, Justice O’Connor, in Adarand, won the 
long war and the Court eventually settled on strict scrutiny for 
racial classifications. Of course, the standard of review was critical 
because contrary to the Court’s judicial rhetoric, strict scrutiny, 
insofar as race-conscious claims are concerned, is almost always 
fatal in fact. 
The Rehnquist Court’s criminal law jurisprudence also shows 
the color-blind jurisprudential regime in action. Some have tried 
to argue to the contrary. Rachel Barkow, for example, has argued 
for a revisionist interpretation of the Rehnquist Court’s criminal 
justice cases.88 Using the attitudinalists as (an easily knocked 
down) straw man,89 Barkow argues that the Court’s conservatives 
 81. Jeffrey Rosen, No More Souters, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, (May 6, 2009, 
7:02 AM), http://www.startribune.com/opinion/44410512.html. 
 82. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 547 (2006). 
 83. Edwin Meese, Constitution Day Speech, Sept. 17, 1985 available at 
http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/returning-to-original-
meaning-attorney-general-meese-looks-to-the-declaration-and-the-constitution. 
 84. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 85. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 86. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 87. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 88. Rachel Barkow, Originalists, Politics and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043 (2006). 
 89.  MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, x (2013); EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: 
HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (2009) (showing that legal 
norms are a non-nominal factor affecting the justices’ voting behavior); Cornell W. 
Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms, 
in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 15, 22-30 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); see also Cornell Clayton & Howard 
Gillman, Introduction, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (Howard 
Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) (describing the new institutionalism as “[s]cholars 
seeking to explore the broader cultural and political contexts of judicial decision making”); 
Charles R. Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court’s Agenda, in SUPREME COURT  
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sometimes voted in surprising ways in non-death penalty cases. 
But pointing to Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause revival90 or 
the Court’s sentencing guidelines cases91 as evidence of the 
Rehnquist’s Court putative mixed or limited partiality to criminal 
defendants is not persuasive. 
The Confrontation Clause cases necessarily focus on what 
happens at trial—but the federal criminal trial is dead to all but 
those who can afford to hire a skilled and expensive lawyer.92 Only 
three percent of federal criminal defendants ever exercise their 
Seventh Amendment right that will trigger their Sixth 
Amendment confrontation clause right.93 The same holds true in 
the sentencing guidelines cases where the Court took away some 
judicial discretion and placed it back in the jury’s hands.94 These 
cases are relatively meaningless in the larger political picture, and 
fit the picture of cases that the New Right regime does not care 
about. Indeed, Barkow admits that the conservatives on the Court 
have voted in ways consistent with the New Right regime in death 
penalty cases, a line of jurisprudence important to the regime, as 
seen by the attention Reagan and his successor placed on it.95 
Moreover, the Rehnquist Court voted in favor of the government 
nearly 80 percent of the time in Fourth Amendment cases, cases 
that are central the criminal justice mores of the Republican 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES DECISION-MAKING 255 
(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (undercutting attitudinalists who 
argue that the Justices grant certiorari to cases to pursue their personal political goals by 
noting that the Justices can only take those cases that are litigated, and if the ACLU, for 
example, ceased to bring lawsuits it would be difficult for the judges to pursue a civil 
liberties agenda as aggressively); Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: 
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUDIES AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
 90. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
 91. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the sentencing 
guidelines were no longer mandatory); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 
(holding judge cannot enhance sentence based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by 
the defendant); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding the Sixth 
Amendment requires aggravating factors that will enhance a sentence must be found by a 
jury). 
 92. Indeed, one could cheekily argue that since only those with the financial means 
can go to trial, perhaps this decision fits the attitudinal model; but this mostly just shows 
how weak the attitudinal model can be in placing some cases in their proper ideological 
space.  
 93. Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse, (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/05/offer-you-can-t-refuse. The picture does not 
improve much even when one considers state criminal trials. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 
Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, at A1. 
 94. Almost needless to say, the holding of Booker regarding deviating from the 
sentencing guidelines is of huge importance for cases whether tried or pled out, but it is 
not an issue that the New Right regime cares much about (as opposed to criminal 
procedure scholars). 
 95. Clayton & Pickerill, supra note 7, at 1415.  
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Party.96 In this instance, the received wisdom about the Rehnquist 
Court needs no revision. 
But our high politics story should not get too far ahead of our 
low politics story. And there might not be a better example of low 
politics than the Willie Horton ad that President Bush used 
against Michael Dukakis in 1988. Willie Horton, in López’s 
recounting, was almost singularly responsible for Bush’s victory: 
“[t]he commercial hit its mark with deadly accuracy. From lagging 
his opponent, Bush gained ground and took the lead” (p. 106). 
This is the conventional wisdom held by many commentators. But 
it is not quite as simple as that. John Sides shows: 
The real story of the Willie Horton and the 1988 campaign is 
about how few people likely saw the ad itself, how it was 
actually news coverage that brought Horton into Americans’ 
living rooms, and how Horton’s impact on voters disappeared 
before Election Day . . . . The Republican convention was 
particularly important. It took Bush from a double-digit deficit 
at the beginning of August to a narrow lead at the end of that 
month. After that, Bush never lost the lead. This is something 
that conventional accounts of the Willie Horton ad rarely 
mention: Dukakis was already behind when the ad appeared.97 
The extent to which the Willie Horton ad actually affected 
the 1988 election is not knowable to a scientific certainty (or 
anywhere close), but the “Willie Horton ad beat Dukakis” 
analysis seems more campaign lore than what we know about the 
larger structural forces (the “fundamentals”) that help explain 
presidential electoral outcomes.98 
As we have now seen, the dog whistle thesis is beginning to 
look like it lacks much explanatory purchase. Nevertheless, López 
remains doggedly devoted to his thesis. To explain President 
Clinton’s victory over President Bush in 1992, López again 
focuses on dog whistling while downplaying other factors. López 
seizes on Clinton’s “Sister Souljah” moment,99 which sent the 
 96. Id. 
 97. John Sides, The Real Impact of the Willie Horton Ad, 2012 (unpublished op-ed 
on file with the author) (emphasis in original). Indeed, López also puts much stock in Tali 
Mendelberg’s study of the Willie Horton ad (pp. 176–78). However, her critique has been 
subject to revision.  
 98. See, e.g., JOHN SIDES & LYNN VAVRECK, THE GAMBLE: CHOICE AND CHANCE 
IN THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 11–13 (2013). 
 99. As López explains: “Clinton accepted an invitation to speak at a convening 
hosted by [Jesse] Jackson, and then to the dismay of the assembled audience used the 
occasion to upbraid a young rap artist, Sister Souljah, for heated comments about the 
recent riots in Los Angeles as well as racially offensive lyrics” (p. 109). Sister Souljah had  
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national press into a tizzy, and Clinton’s decision to fly home to 
Arkansas during the campaign to preside over the execution of a 
mentally impaired black man, Ricky Ray Rector. López captures 
the dog whistling politics of the moment by quoting Clinton as 
saying: “I can be nicked a lot, but no one can say I’m soft on 
crime” (p. 109).100 
Curiously, though, López elides here what he characterizes 
early on as one of the significant components of dog whistling: 
“As one among a range of ‘social issues’ used by conservatives, 
racial dog whistle politics can be understood as part of a larger 
effort to flimflam voters . . . .” (p. 29). López continues: 
“Righteously attacking social liberalism becomes a surreptitious 
way to defeat economic liberalism” (pp. 29-30). In other words, 
López identifies attacking social liberalism as an important 
corollary to the GOP’s strategy to implement economic policy 
that is “wrecking” the middle class. 
However, when attempting to explain Bush’s 1992 loss, 
López finds that “[d]ivisive cultural politics” were “off-putting to 
moderates” (p. 107); thus, the electorate turned to Clinton. One 
must wonder, and López does not explain such, why moderate 
voters did not go for conservatives “stok[ing] cultural divisions as 
cover for a politics that primarily serves the very wealthy” in 1992 
(p. 30). Why do voters sometimes hear the dog whistle, and, 
apparently, sometimes ignore it? 
López also partially misinterprets Clinton’s actions while in 
office, pointing to welfare reform (pp. 109-10). While Clinton did 
promise on the campaign trail to “end welfare as we know it,” 
once in office he did little toward that end. It was only after the 
1994 Republican wave election that Clinton began to act on 
welfare reform. López states: “Clinton ended Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, a welfare program for impoverished 
children that had been a staple of the New Deal approach since 
1936, but which the right had trashed in racist terms for 
encouraging poor black women to have children out of wedlock” 
(pp. 109-10). This is a tendentious reading of history. First, Aid 
for Dependent Children (as the program was initially known), was 
initially constructed so that benefits would go primarily to poor 
stated: “If black people kill black people every day, why not have a week and kill white 
people?” Sheila Rule, Rapper, Chided by Clinton, Calls Him a Hypocrite, N.Y. TIMES, June 
17, 1992, at A22.  
 100. López is fair enough to note that Rector’s mental impairment came as a result of 
a failed suicide attempt after Rector had killed a civilian and a police officer, something 
that most commentators fail to note (p. 108).  
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whites and not to poor blacks; Southern Democratic Senators saw 
to this.101 Second, every president from Johnson through Reagan 
made various attempts to reform welfare.102 Thus, an effort to 
reform welfare is not a particularly compelling example of 
racialized politics. 
In contrast to his previous analysis, López sees little to no dog 
whistling during the 2000 campaign.103 Instead, López’s dog 
whistling target changes course after 2000.104 López, because he 
wants to focus on anti-Muslim American dog whistling during the 
George W. Bush presidency, points the reader to Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, where Iqbal was essentially racially profiled and detained.105 
But this case is more likely to end up in a civil procedure textbook, 
not a constitutional law one. The case turned on the majority’s 
perfunctory application of Feeney and a raising of the bar to plead 
facts with sufficient particularity under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. A better example of such high court dog whistling that 
López omits is Justice Scalia’s speech, unveiled after 9/11, titled: 
Mullahs of the West: Judges as Authoritative Expositors of the 
Natural Law? As I have noted elsewhere, “Scalia, almost needless 
to say, was analogizing alleged ‘[liberal] judicial hegemony’ with 
Islamic fundamentalism. Beyond the ten-dollar words, the speech 
is dog whistling to the right.”106 
Though López briefly discusses Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke107 (p. 87), he fails to discuss Grutter v. 
Bollinger.108 The latter poses problems for his thesis that the 
conservative coalition has used dog whistling to benefit the 
“super-rich” (p. xii). López does not note, for example, that the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief opposing the 
affirmative action program in Bakke, but 25 years later, as 
explicitly cited by Justice O’Connor in upholding the University 
 101. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 43–48 (2005).  
 102. GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 179–83 (1999). 
 103. But this is problematic. One need look no further than the South Carolina 
primary, when Bush broke Reagan’s Eleventh Commandment—an apocryphal progenitor 
of the saying, as it were—and attacked insurgent John McCain via a whisper campaign that 
McCain had fathered an African American child out-of-wedlock. Elisabeth Bumiller, 
McCain Parries a Reprise of 2000 Smear Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 104. López does not discuss Clinton’s victory over Bob Dole in 1996. 
 105. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 106. Calvin TerBeek, Rethinking Scalia’s Legacy, BALLS & STRIKES (July 10, 2014), 
http://constitutionalpoliticsdotcom.wordpress.com/2014/07/10/rethinking-justice-scalias-
legacy/. 
 107. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 108. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s 
affirmative action program).  
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of Michigan law school’s affirmative action program, corporations 
had changed their tune—they wanted the program upheld. 
Fortune 500 companies such as American Express, Coca-Cola, 
Dow Chemical and General Electric filed a brief in support of the 
affirmative action program.109 One scholar has maintained that 
this seeming contradiction, the Court supporting a race-conscious 
policy despite its overall bent toward colorblindness, is best 
explained because the Justices are elites and elite preference is for 
race-conscious affirmative action policies in the higher education 
context.110 However, this explanation is on shaky ground. Whether 
the elites’ preferences continue to be taken into account remains 
to be seen. As Fisher v. Texas111 works its way back up the judicial 
ladder (again)—Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter—the color-
blind jurisprudential regime may finally realize Reagan’s goal of 
ending affirmative action in all contexts. Perhaps the simplest 
explanation is that Justice O’Connor was a country-club 
Republican, a dying breed, and Justice Kennedy, when it comes 
to racial matters, is not, excepting his proclivity for limiting the 
death penalty in certain cases.112 
To his credit, López does discuss Shelby County v. Holder,113 
where the Court’s racial conservatives told us: “We also noted 
that “[t]hings have changed in the South. Voter turnout and 
registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory 
evasions of federal decrees are rare.”114 Shortly thereafter, 
conservative controlled state legislatures, a number of them in the 
South, passed laws designed to restrict voting.115 In a study of 
voter-restrictive laws passed in state legislatures from 2006-2011, 
researchers found that the “proposal and passage [of the laws] are 
 109. Their collective amicus brief can be found at http://supreme. lp.findlaw.com/
supreme_court/briefs/02-241/02-241.mer.ami.sixtyfive.pdf. 
 110. Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347 (2003); 
DESMOND & KING, HOUSE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 108-09. For a cogent critique of elite 
higher education policy, see SUZANNE METTLER, DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE 
POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM (2014). 
 111. Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 112. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (sexual assault of a child is 
not death penalty eligible crime); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty 
does not extend to juveniles). 
 113. Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) 
 114. Id. at 2625, citing Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 
U. S. 193 (2009). 
 115. Alana Semuels, New Voter ID Laws: Nothing like it ‘since Reconstruction,’ L.A. 
TIMES (May 4, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-voter-
identification-laws-state-by-state-20140504-story.html.  
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highly partisan, strategic and racialized affairs.”116 As cultural 
critic Louis Menand acerbically noted in response to Shelby 
County: “What’s so changed about that?”117 
But perhaps the apotheosis of the color-blind jurisprudential 
regime can be found in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Parents 
Involved. 118 Running the gamut of the regime’s cases119 (e.g., Shaw 
v. Hunt,120 Adarand, Bakke and Milliken), Roberts struck down 
school desegregation programs in Seattle and Louisville, then 
claimed the mantle of Brown for the color-blind regime. Roberts 
ended his opinion with this statement (almost certainly intended 
to appeal to the media): “The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” 121 
One year after Parents Involved came down, the nation 
elected its first black president. The 2008 election was the most 
racialized election in modern American history, as political 
scientists David O. Sears and Michael Tesler have shown.122 In 
discussing this election, López focuses largely on the petty crimes 
of right-wing provocateurs and Sarah Palin, but the McCain 
campaign team largely refrained from dog whistling.123 This was 
because McCain did not need to. As an initial matter, racial 
liberals overwhelmingly supported Obama even in the 
Democratic primaries, and racially conservative Democrats—
despite also being gender conservatives—voted for Hilary 
Clinton: “racial attitudes were so powerful that they actually 
made Hilary Clinton the preferred choice of modern day sexists in 
the Democratic primaries.”124 
The general election followed the same arc. Even after 
controlling for all the relevant variables, Sears and Tesler found 
that racial resentment was more prominent in 2008 than any other 
modern presidential contest.125 As President Obama’s chief 
 116. Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and 
Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Politices, 11 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 1088 (2013). 
 117. Louis Menand, The Color of Law, NEW YORKER, July 8, 2013, at 80, 89. 
 118. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents Involved), 551 
U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
 119. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 12.  
 120. 517 U.S. 899, 909–10 (1996) (“an effort to alleviate the effects of societal 
discrimination is not a compelling interest”). 
 121. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 742–43. 
 122. MICHAEL TESLER & DAVID O. SEARS, OBAMA’S RACE: THE 2008 ELECTION 
AND THE DREAM OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2010). 
 123. Id. at 55. López correctly points out that Hilary Clinton engaged in some of her 
own coded racial rhetoric in the Democratic primary (pp. 111–12). 
 124. TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 8 (emphasis in original). 
 125. Id. at. 59–60.  
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pollster incisively told Gwen Ifill after Obama’s victory: “The 
thing is, a black man can’t be president of America, given the 
racial aversion and history that’s still out there . . . However, an 
extraordinary, gifted, and talented young man who happens to be 
black can be president.”126 
After López finishes his analysis of Romney’s loss in 2012 
and the Tea Party,127 he attempts to flesh out exactly how the 
middle class have been dog whistled into misery. Earlier in the 
book, López asserts that “[r]acial demagoguery convinces many 
whites to think about government in terms of race, and then to 
reject liberalism and the lessons of the New Deal in favor of the 
nostrums promoted by corporate titans and loaded insiders” (p. 
74). 
To find support for this, López turns to Thomas Frank’s 
polemic What’s the Matter With Kansas, which he finds 
“persuasive” (p. 169). Indeed, López thinks Frank’s thesis—that 
conservatives vote for Republicans based on social issues (e.g., 
“guns, gays and god”) instead of voting for Democrats, which is 
in their economic interest—only fails insofar as it does not 
understand the power of dog whistle racism: “it’s also clear that 
race contributes to broad-based support for regressive policies 
that wreck the middle class” (p. 170). 
However, Frank’s thesis has been thoroughly debunked. 
Political scientist Larry Bartels, reviewing What’s the Matter With 
Kansas?, has shown that the definition of “white working class” 
utilized by Frank is imprecise at best: 
Even in 2004, after decades of increasingly widespread college 
education, the economic circumstances of whites without 
college degrees were not much different from those of America 
as a whole. Among those who voted, 40% had family incomes 
in excess of $60,000; and when offered the choice, more than 
half actually called themselves “middle class” rather than 
“working class.” Meanwhile, among working-class white voters 
who could even remotely be considered “poor” – those with 
incomes in the bottom third of the national income distribution 
 126. Quoted in TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 56 (emphasis in original). 
 127. Given the largely economic nature of the issues surrounding the 2012 election, 
López focuses more on the conservative media provocateurs (e.g., Ann Coulter, Rush 
Limbaugh, Pat Buchanan, Roger Ailes). López is on point when he sniffs out the racial 
resentment animating the Tea Party that other scholars have failed to note (p. 151), but 
when he attempts to connect his thesis to Romney’s economic agenda it stretches it to the 
breaking point (pp. 162–67).  
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– George W. Bush’s margin of victory in 2004 was not 23 
percentage points but less than two percentage points.128 
Moreover, as Jeffrey Stonecash (another political scientist) 
shows in his book Class and Party in American Politics, “less-
affluent whites have not moved away from the Democratic Party 
and . . . class divisions have not declined in American politics.”129 
While rich states tend to vote Democratic, rich persons vote 
Republican, and while poor states tend to lean Republican, 
poorer voters vote for the Democratic candidate.130 “Indeed, low-
income voters’ presidential preferences in 2004 were considerably 
more influenced by economic [rather] than cultural issues, while 
high-income voters showed no such differentiation.”131 The 
empirical fact is that income has been a strong predictor of 
support for Republicans among voters since the 1950s.132 Simply 
put, López’s argument that dog whistling has “wrecked” the 
middle class by convincing working-class and middle class whites 
to vote based on conservative social issues does not stand up to 
scrutiny. 
So where does that leave us? López’s thesis—that dog 
whistling has wrecked the middle class—is not borne out by the 
facts. Dog whistling cannot explain electoral victories, never mind 
economic inequality, nor does the Court, outside of the 
idiosyncratic Justice Scalia, appear to dog whistle. Indeed, it may 
even be too much to say that dog whistling is reinvented racism. 
Naomi Murakawa has argued that one can trace “law and order” 
rhetoric back to the New Deal: “national leaders explicitly and 
routinely addressed black civil rights in criminological terms—
and they did so nearly two decades . . . before the Goldwater 
presidential campaign of 1964.”133 Vesla Weaver has come to 
similar conclusion.134 
While we can jettison dog whistling as the explanation for the 
New Right regime, it seems clear that López is right to focus on 
race, even if his specific thesis is lacking. Racial politics matter 
deeply in the United States and they affect almost every policy 
 128. Larry Bartels, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 1 QUARTERLY J. POL. SCI. 201, 
205 (2006). 
 129. JEFFREY M. STONECASH, CLASS AND PARTY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 118 (2000). 
 130. ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE 
(2008). 
 131. TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 15. 
 132. Bartels, supra note 128, at 208–09. 
 133. Murakawa, supra note 15, at 235. 
 134. Weaver, supra note 15, at 240–42, 265.  
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area.135 White Americans are racially conservative, Republicans 
and Democrats alike (though the latter somewhat less so).136 
Indeed, Latinos are racially resentful toward African 
Americans.137 Thus, while elites may utilize racial rhetoric, 
perhaps the more pragmatic explanation is that they are talking 
to a significant segment of American voters. One is reminded of 
George Wallace’s quote: “I started off talking about schools and 
highways and prisons and taxes—and I couldn’t make them listen. 
Then I began talking about niggers—and they stomped the 
floor.”138 While such rhetoric would be a miserable failure today, 
the point is that elites will not return to and reshape rhetoric that 
voters are unresponsive to. From the brief sketch I have given 
above, preaching to the choir seems a safer causal bet than dog 
whistling. 
Turning back to the Court: because the New Right regime is 
made of up of racial conservatives, this explains the creation of a 
color-blind jurisprudential regime that now stretches back to the 
1970s, long enough that Chief Justice Roberts can easily rely on 
friendly precedent to beat back “race-conscious” constitutional 
arguments. Though the law reviews are beset with criticism of 
what they term “color-blind jurisprudence” and the obligatory 
normative call to a “race-conscious” alternative,139 they do so in 
an intellectual vacuum. This does not help us understand all the 
political forces at work, as I have made a modest attempt to do so 
here. The New Right regime may be in decay—or Obama may be 
just another Clintonian disjunctive president—but the color-blind 
jurisprudential regime has grown quite thick since the 1970s. And 
the Court’s racial conservatives—Scalia is the oldest, approaching 
80-years old, never mind that two of the Court’s racial liberals, 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, may not have much time left—are 
likely to continue to reject race-conscious policy issues that 
become constitutionalized in the near future. Affirmative action 
in the higher education context may soon fall (as noted above), 
and the color-blind jurisprudential regime will continue to 
 135. Some scholars have tried to argue that racial conservatism has been subsumed by 
economic conservatism. NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, 
POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 2 (2006). But 
as King and Smith have shown, this is an overreach. KING & SMITH, supra note 4, at 258–
68. 
 136. TESLER & SEARS, supra note 123, at 19–20. 
 137. Id. at 97–98. 
 138. CARTER, supra note 14, at 109. 
 139. See, e.g., Tanya Keteri Hernandez, “Multi-Racial Discourse: Racial 
Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 161–70 (1998). 
López’s prescription for ending dog whistling does not much improve on this (p. 221–30).  
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facilitate law-enforcement goals, in spite of the fact that the War 
on Drugs has disproportionately affected minorities.140 After all, 
“an effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not 
a compelling interest.”141 Racial liberals should expect victories in 
the Court to be few and far between in the foreseeable future. 
In sum, before scholars can proceed forward with useful 
normative claims about racial politics, we need to get the 
descriptive details correct first. If my analysis above is correct, dog 
whistling appears to be barking up the wrong descriptive tree. It 
is difficult, but not impossible, to tease out the role of race in 
American politics and more empirically-minded scholarship is 
needed on this point. Indeed, a rich research agenda is begging to 
be acted on here.142 What is more, because the Court plays an 
outsized role in determining the constitutionality of many racial 
policies, a better understanding of the Court’s role is crucial to the 
descriptive story as well. Until that much is accomplished, we will 
simply continue to keep on whistlin’ Dixie. 
 
 140. MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS 23-24 (2009); AMY E. 
LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 41–45 (2014). 
 141. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909–910 (1996). 
 142. I have pointed to some of the few scholars who are working toward this goal: 
Rogers Smith, Desmond King, Vesla Weaver, Naomi Murakawa, the late William Stuntz, 
Carol Steiker, James Forman, Jr., Jeffrey Fagan, Jennifer Hochschild and Marie 
Gottschalk, to name a few.  
 
